Internet DRAFT - draft-ebalard-mext-hld-security
draft-ebalard-mext-hld-security
Network Working Group A. Ebalard
Internet-Draft EADS
Intended status: Informational April 30, 2009
Expires: November 1, 2009
Mobile IPv6 Home Link Detection Mechanism Security considerations
draft-ebalard-mext-hld-security-00
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Abstract
MIPv6 defines the concept of Home Network for a MN, in opposition to
the foreign network where this entity may find itself. A ``Home Link
Detection'' mechanism is also specified to allow the MN to detect
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when it is at home.
MIPv6 specification mandates the use of IPsec for protecting main
signaling traffic and also defines how IPsec can be used to protect
data traffic between the MN and its HA. Even if optional, it is
expected that many deployments of MIPv6 will use it by default for MN
which may roam outside a trusted infrastructure (e.g. outside a
mobile operator network).
When a MN detects it is at home, it is expected to stop IPsec
protection for data traffic exchanged with its Home Agent. That
event is the result of the Home Return procedure, triggered by the
Home Link Detection mechanism.
This document discusses the possible threats and security impacts
associated with the use of this insecure NDP-based mechanism as a
trigger to drop IPsec protection of data traffic for the MN. It also
provides some results on the implementation of the attacks against an
existing MIPv6 module. Possible solutions are suggested.
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Table of Contents
1. Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Scope and Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Mechanisms overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Home Link Detection mechanisms overview . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Returning home events overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Theoretical threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Full deregistration attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Partial deregistration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Implementing the attacks: PoC against UMIP . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. MN's configuration and behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2. Attacker announcing a MN's Home Network Prefix . . . . . . 13
5.3. Attacker relaying BU/BA via HAO/RH2 addition . . . . . . . 14
5.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. Workarounds and solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1. Improve reference documents consistency . . . . . . . . . 21
6.2. Use of SEND in Home Link Detection mechanism . . . . . . . 21
6.3. Never drop IPsec tunnel protection . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.4. No home network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appendix A. MIPv6 Home Return . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.1. Mobile IPv6 Home Link detection mechanism . . . . . . . . 24
A.2. Emission of deregistration BU by the MN . . . . . . . . . 24
A.3. Receipt and validation of deregistration BU by the HA . . 27
A.4. Local impacts of BU processing on the HA and emission
of BA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.5. Local impact associated with BU emission and BA
processing on the MN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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1. Keywords
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Scope and Hypothesis
2.1. Scope
MIPv6 entities (MN and HA) perform Neighbor Discovery Protocol
exchanges, for various needs:
o the HA: acting as a ND proxy for registered MN which are currently
in a foreign network, the HA defends the MN's HoA on the MN's Home
Link when it is away, intercepts packets destined to the HoA and
tunnels them to the associated MN at its CoA. Its operations as a
ND Proxy for MN's HoA are basically subject to the same ND threats
as the ones existing for common neighbors of the link. Those are
not covered in the document.
In practice, additional hypothesis can be made about the Home
Network; Being part of a controlled infrastructure, those threats
can be reduced, mitigated or avoided.
As discussed in next item dedicated to the MN, those hypothesis
can usually not be made about the foreign networks where the MN
operates.
o the MN: upon movement, the MN performs link layer interactions
with the new foreign network it finds itself in. By default, from
a security standpoint, those foreign networks must be considered
as hostile environments (i.e. with possible attackers). This
hypothesis may be relaxed in specific deployments where the MN is
expected to roam only between trusted networks (e.g. mobile
operator networks). We do not consider these relaxed/specific
hypothesis in the document.
The interactions of the MN on foreign networks can be summarized
the following way: it sends RS messages in order to get some RA
from the router(s) of the link. The RA gathered during the router
discovery steps are used by the MN to configure a CoA and most
importantly to detect if the current link is the home link or a
foreign link.
For that reason, the MN in this potentially hostile environment is
subject to ND protocol threats, already described in [RFC3756].
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But because the Home Link detection mechanism is based on
information gathered using NDP and may be the trigger for some
additional critical security steps, it may be a vector for
additional MIPv6 threats.
Specifically, this document focuses on the MIPv6-specific link layer
security issues associated with home link detection (and Home Return
procedure). It discusses the possible security issues associated
with current definition of those mechanisms, lack of security
considerations on those mechanisms and inacurracies in reference
documents.
2.2. Hypothesis
For the reasons introduced in Section 2.1, one important hypothesis
made in the document is that tunneled traffic (data and possibly some
specific signaling messages) is protected using IPsec in tunnel mode,
even if not mandated by the reference documents. Some arguments
justify this decision:
o The Home Agent and the Mobile Node belong to a common trust
domain, and are already expected to support IPsec and share common
credentials for protecting signaling with IPsec in transport mode.
In that context, supporting tunnel mode is expected to be
inexpensive from a deployment standpoint. The main remaining
point in this discussion is the possible performance cost of
handling IPsec protected data traffic in the home network.
o As specified in [RFC3776] and [RFC4877], ``Tunnel mode IPsec ESP
MUST be supported and SHOULD be used for the protection of packets
belonging to the return routability procedure''.
o Protection of IPsec payload traffic is documented for both static
and dynamic keying with IKEv1 [RFC3776] and IKEv2 [RFC4877].
Various implementations are known to support it.
o Except for specific devices which will operate on some trusted
operator or internal networks, Mobile Nodes are expected to find
themselves in untrusted/hostile foreign networks. In that
context, corporate deployments will require the use of IPsec for
tunneled data. Public deployments will also probably follow that
path.
In the end, as discussed later in this section, IPsec tunneling and
common (IPv6-in-IPv6) tunneling of data are basically handled in the
same way with regard to home return.
The rest of the document discusses the possible issues associated
with current Home Link Detection mechanism and ``Returning Home''
procedure as specified in the main MIPv6 reference documents
([RFC3775], [RFC3776], [RFC4877], [draft-ietf-mext-rfc3775bis], and
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[RFC5026]).
As described previously, this is done under the hypothesis that IPsec
is used to protect the traffic exchanged between the Mobile Node and
its Home Agent.
3. Mechanisms overview
To keep current section a reasonable size, the detailed analysis of
reference documents including normative excerpts of those
specifications is maintained in Appendix A, at the end of the
document. If you are interested by more details on the topic, you
should definitely read that appendix.
Here, we provide an overview of:
o The Home Link Detection mechanism performed by the MN
o The events associated with the ``Returning Home'' procedure on
both the MN and the HA.
It is based on the detailed analysis available in the appendix.
3.1. Home Link Detection mechanisms overview
The MIPv6 specification provides a simple (one would say primitive)
Home Link detection mechanism for the MN: simply put, when a Prefix
Information Option found in a RA message received by the MN includes
its Home Subnet prefix, the MN considers it is on its Home Link.
3.2. Returning home events overview
The reaction of the MN to previous event (detection of home network)
is defined, but in a loose fashion:
o It is expected to send a deregistration BU: the content of the BU
is provided by [RFC3775] (the set of flags in MH header) but the
specific format of the packet is just suggested (no HAO and no
AltCoA option). In practice, the document does not prevent an
implementation to include an AltCoA option or a Destination Option
Header carrying a Home Address Option (HAO).
o [RFC3775] precisely describes the steps that should then occur at
ND level, in order for the MN to be able to use its HoA, which was
previously defended by the HA. We do not cover those steps here.
o [RFC3775] expects the tunnel with the HA to be torn down.
[RFC3776] also follows that direction by expecting the IPsec
tunnel with the HA to be torn down. In practice, this is what
existing implementations do.
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o The specific order in which things are expected to happen is
unclear, and more or less left as an implementation decision
despite its importance: the MN may not wait for the BA to come
back from the HA in order to tear its IPsec tunnel down; just like
it may not wait (for obvious latency reasons) for a BA to come
back to update its IPsec tunnel SP/SA when performing a handover
to another foreign network.
4. Theoretical threats
The security aspects of the Home Link Detection mechanism and
``Returning Home'' procedure are not covered in any of the MIPv6
reference documents. Those are basically not considered as possible
threat vectors. One possible reason for that may be the fact that
protection of data traffic (authentication, privacy, ...) is not
considered in the documents (support and use of IPsec for that
purpose is optional). MIPv6 reference documents focus on the
protection of the infrastructure (address ownership considerations,
...) but not on security of user traffic.
4.1. Full deregistration attack
Here, we discuss the possible threats associated with the loose
expectations of reference documents and the reliance on untrusted
information to trigger changes in tunneling and IPsec security
policies.
The only document which considers the topic is
[draft-haddad-mext-mip6-residual-threats], which has an interesting
Section 5 entitled ``Exploiting Neighbor Discovery in a MIPv6
Environment''. That section being quite short, it is provided (text
is extracted from current version, i.e. version 2) here for
completeness and commented below as an initial introduction to the
possible threats:
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...
This threat offers a malicious node two edges. It requires first
that the attacker be attached to the same foreign link as the MN,
and the discovery of the MN's home agent IP address as well as the
MN's IP home address (which may not pose a serious problem). After
learning these two information, the attacker advertises the MN's
home prefix on the link thus leading the MN to believe that it has
returned to its home network. Such information will prompt the MN
to send a BU message to its HA to request de-registration.
However, such early de-registration may not be possible as the
foreign network may have activated ingress filtering. But the main
goal for the attacker is to get a valid copy of the MN's BU message
and such goal is achieved. If the malicious node concludes that
the MN is still receiving data packets tunneled by the HA to its
current CoA, then it will get involved in the MN de-registeration
procedure by forwarding the BU message to the MN's HA on another
interface where ingress filtering is not activated (i.e. under the
assumption that the attacker is multihomed). Upon receiving the
BU message, the HA will de-register the MN and stops tunneling data
packets to the MN's CoA. In addition, the HA sends back a BA
message which will never reach the MN. From that moment, the data
traffic sent by the CN(s) stops at the MN's home network. However,
the lack of ACK messages sent by the MN will prompt the CN(s) at
some point to halt sending data traffic and eventually tear down
the session(s).
However, the situation gets worse if the malicious node decides to
push further in his attack by sending fake ACK messages to the
CN(s), i.e. using the MN's home address. In such situation, the
CN(s) will keep sending data traffic to the MN's HA (where they
eventually get discarded) and thus, may cause severe disruption
within the home access network, possibly leading to a network
flooding attack in some specific topologies.
Note that as they may be more than one MN attached to the same
foreign link and using the same home prefix, such attack may lead
to collective de-registration.
...
As discussed in the draft and predicted by the summary provided
previously, it is expected to be quite easy for an attacker on a
foreign link to have a MN think that it is at home and have it send a
de-registration BU. For that purpose, as noted in the draft, the
attacker only needs to acquire the Home Agent address, its Home
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Prefix and have the ability to forge packets. The addresses are
public information available from the traffic of the MN.
The draft introduces the possibility that ingress filtering
implemented in the foreign network could lead to the BU being dropped
before hitting the HA.
In fact, for a common HAO-free deregistration BU packet sent by a MN
to its HA while believing it is at home, the source address of the
packet is the HoA. With that hypothesis, the packet is both
topologically invalid from the foreign network's perspective (it
should be dropped if some filtering mechanism has been put in place
by the ISP of the foreign site or even the administrator of the
site), but it is also invalid from the destination site's perspective
(it should definitely be dropped at the MN's network site
boundaries). But those expectations do not provide any real security
guarantees.
The solution proposed in the draft for the attacker is to relay its
packets via another connection mean which does not undergo ingress
filtering. It is interesting to note that it will still not work if
the Home Network implements ingress filtering too, and the attacker
(and the MN) will never get a Binding Ack in response. The only way
for an attacker would be to have a simultaneous access to the MN's
foreign network and to its home network.
Let's be wild and consider for a moment that an implementation does
not have restrictions (both from the MN packet build perspective and
the HA processing perspective) on the expected format of the BU.
This could be the case because of code reuse. In that context, there
are some paths the attacker may explore. For instance, if the
attacker manages to get access to the ESP protected deregistration BU
sent by the MN in its expected common format (while believing it is
at home):
IPv6 header (source = HoA,
destination = HA address)
ESP header in transport mode
Mobility header
Binding Update
It could simply modify the packet in the following way to add a
destination option header with an HAO to make it look that way:
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IPv6 header (source = Attacker_Address,
destination = HA address)
Destination Options header
Home Address option (HoA)
ESP header in transport mode
Mobility header
Binding Update
The packet is still perfectly valid at all levels:
o The part protected by ESP has not been modified during the
addition so it should still be gracefully processed by the HA
IPsec stack. It is expected that the processing of the HAO be
performed before the IPsec processing, hence replacing the
attacker address (Attacker_Address) by the HoA.
o Mobility Header checksum is computed based on MH content (which
has not been modified) and using the usual L4 pseudo header which
is also the same after the changes: the final addresses are still
the HoA and the Home Agent address, the next header field is still
MH. The last element of the pseudo header, the length of the
upper layer is not bound to the modified payload length field of
the IPv6 header but to the unchanged length field of the MH
header.
In the end, the mangled packet now has a more interesting layout: it
has a topologically valid source address which will allow it to be
routed to the HA. For previous reasons, it should be processed
successfully by the IPsec stack of the HA and delivered to its MIPv6
module. Then, whether it will be considered valid by the HA is a
matter of implementation and interpretation of the reference
documents. Among the remaining questions/points, we can list the
following:
o There is no AltCoA in the packet: in our example, there is none.
But, here again, reference documents are not clear on the topic.
AltCoA is usually expected in BU to benefit from the IPsec
protection. But there are specific non normative notes in
[RFC3775] and [RFC3776] for deregistration BU sent from Home:
usual ones do not include the AltCoA option. This point is mainly
left as an implementation issue. For instance, the Mobile IPv6
implementation for Linux (UMIP) always includes the AltCoA option,
even for deregistration BU sent when back home.
o Under the assumption that the HA processes the BU, can we expect
it to send the BA in the same fashion, using a RH2? This is
clearly implementation dependent. From a specification point of
view, the BA is expected to be always sent to the source address
of initial packet. In our example, Attacker_Address.
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o Will the attacker be able to mangle received BA and have it be
processed by the MN? For the same reasons as the ones given
above, this may be possible.
As a temporary summary, the specific implementation of the MIPv6
module running on the MN and the HA, the kind of filtering
implemented in the foreign and home networks will impact the
difficulty and requirements of setting up a full BU/BA exchange
leading to a complete deregistration on both sides.
4.2. Partial deregistration
It is interesting to note that the final goal of the attacker may not
be to mount a full deregistration attack, but to have the MN drop its
IPsec tunnel protection. In that context, a full attack would
obviously do the job but some less difficult solutions may exist.
For instance, the reference documents leave quite some latitude with
respect to the order of events. For obvious performance reasons, it
is common for a MIPv6 modules not to wait for the BA from its HA to
start using its new address. In the context of the deregistration
when coming back home, the MN may drop its IPsec tunnel protection
early, just after sending its BU and before receiving the BA. Mobile
IPv6 for Linux implementation (UMIP) can be configured to do that.
4.3. Conclusion
As a conclusion, the Home Link Detection mechanism rely on untrusted
and spoofable ND information. It is used as a trigger for a
significant security event when IPsec is used for protecting data
between the MN and its HA: the removal of this IPsec tunnel
protection on a foreign network.
Moreover, various parts of the reference documents leave quite some
room for the build and processing of packets and the order of events
associated with deregistration and Home Return. It may lead to
interoperability issues and may also simplify the work of an attacker
which intend to exploit previous flaws.
From our standpoint, when IPsec is used to protect data traffic, even
if an attacker manages to access the Home Subnet of a MN, this should
not provide her the ability to have one such MN drop its IPsec
protection on a foreign network. At the moment, current MIPv6
reference documents may allow that to happen.
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5. Implementing the attacks: PoC against UMIP
This section documents the implementation of the attacks described in
previous section against an existing implementation. The targeted
implementation is UMIP, the freely available Linux implementation.
The tool used to implement the attack in order to create or mangle
MIPv6 packets is Scapy.
5.1. MN's configuration and behavior
In this section, a Linux MN running UMIP is considered, configured in
order for signaling and data traffic to be IPsec-protected. The
former undergoing transport mode protection and the latter tunnel
mode protection.
One configuration parameter of interest in the following discussions
is OptimisticHandoff option. It has the following description in the
software man page:
When a Mobile Node sends a Binding Update to the Home Agent, no
Route Optimized or reverse tunneled traffic is sent until a
Binding Acknowledgement is received. When enabled, this option
allows the Mobile Node to assume that the binding was successful
right after the BU has been sent, and does not wait for a
positive acknowledgement before using RO or reverse tunneling.
Even if the option is disabled by default it is useful to limit the
effect of the RTT between the MN and its HA when performing a
handover. For that reason, chances are high client will enable it.
It should be noted that the effect of the option is
(unintentionally?) different whether the MN performs a movement to a
foreign network or to the home network.
In former case, when the option is enabled, directly after sending
its BU, the MN migrates the tunnel endpoint of its tunnel mode IPsec
SP/SA (and warns the IKE daemon of the change of CoA) as usual but
also removes a blocking rule for traffic which would normally be kept
until the BA is received. From the user perspective, the switch has
already happened, even if the HA has not yet acknowledged it with a
BA.
In latter case, when the option is enabled, all the changes required
for the direct unprotected communication of the MN on its Home Link
are done directly after the emission of the BU. Nonetheless, a rule
which prevents packets sent from the HoA to flow remains until the
protected BA is received from the HA. In the end, while waiting for
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the BA, the MN does process unprotected traffic sent to its HoA but
is unable to reply (i.e. sent traffic back from its HoA).
Previous behavior when the OptimisticHandoff option is enabled
deserves some comments:
o Considering the latency argument (RTT of the BU/BA exchange) does
not hold when the MN comes back home, the fact that UMIP also
performs a optimistic handoff in this situation looks like a bug
or at least a bad idea.
o The rule preventing traffic from the HoA until the reception of
the BA seems inconsistent with the rest of the code (it may be
here by luck).
5.2. Attacker announcing a MN's Home Network Prefix
This subsection documents the effect on a UMIP-based (IPsec-
protected) MN of an attacker injecting fake RA, advertising the Home
Network Prefix (and the Home Agent address).
+----+
| MN |
+-+--+
|
v 2) BU
| +-----+
---+--------------+-------------| RTR |--- INTERNET
| +-----+
^ 1) fake RA
|
+----+-----+
| Attacker |
+----------+
As introduced in previous subsection, the behavior of an UMIP MN vary
based on the value of the OptimisticHandoff configuration parameter.
If it is disabled (the default), the MN is unable to communicate
before the IPsec protected BA is received from the HA. In that case,
the attack results in a DoS, but does not allow the attacker to
directly send traffic to node or access traffic sent by the node.
When the OptimisticHandoff option is enabled, reception of the RA
advertising the Home Network prefix of the MN directly leaves the MN
without IPsec protection on the attacker's link. As covered in
previous subsection, a residual blackhole route which is only dropped
after the reception of the BA by the MN prevents it to leak data
packets. Nonetheless, even if it is unable to reply, the MN will
happily process packets sent to its HoA (to listening UDP services
for instance).
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5.3. Attacker relaying BU/BA via HAO/RH2 addition
As described in previous subsection, an attacker only advertising the
Home Network Prefix to an UMIP MN may be able, depending on the
specific configuration of the peer, to have it drop the IPsec tunnel
protecting data traffic.
At most, in the best software configuration for the attacker
(OptimisticHandoff enabled on the MN), this may allow it to have
traffic sent to the peer on its HoA. The inability for the MN to
send traffic back from the HoA (blackhole rule installed until the
reception of the BA) will prevent TCP connection to happen.
Now, as explained in the first part of the document, the attacker can
improve the attack by mangling ESP-protected deregistration BU sent
by the peer (to the attacker, which the MN believes to be its HA) and
then resend it to the HA. The setup is depicted on the following
picture:
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+----+
| MN | (HoA:2001:db8::2:20d:93ff:fe55:8f79)
+-+--+
|
v 2) BU to HA@
| +-----+
---+-------+----- some foreign net ----| RTR |
| +-----+
^ 1) fake RA (advertising |
| 2001:db8:2:21e:bff:fe4e:3b2/64) |
^ 5) mangled BA |
| |
| |
(2001:db8::2:21e:bff:fe4e:3b2) |
+----+-----+ |
| Attacker | |
+----+-----+ |
(2001:db8::4:207:40ff:fe53:e1e4) |
| _____|____
| / \
v 3) mangled BU to HA / \
| +-----+ | |
--------+-----------------| RTR |------| INTERNET |
+-----+ | |
\ /
\__________/
|
^ 4) BA to
| attacker
|
+-+--+
| HA |
+-+--+
(2001:db8::2:21e:bff:fe4e:3b2)
|
Home Network (2001:db8:0:2::/64) |
----------------------------------------------+--------
The attacker now has two interfaces (it may be possible to mount the
attack with one interface but this is not presented for clarity
reasons), one on which it interacts with the MN and the other which
it uses to send/receive packets to/from the HA. On that second
interface, its address (used in following descriptions) is 2001:db8::
4:207:40ff:fe53:e1e4.
The HA is available at 2001:db8::2:21e:bff:fe4e:3b2, the Home Subnet
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of the MN being 2001:db8:0:2::/64. The MN's HoA is 2001:db8::2:20d:
93ff:fe55:8f79.
Extending the code developed for previous attack basically involves
mangling the packet in the following way (Scapy/Python code):
...
ipv6 = pkt[IPv6] # access IPv6 layer from received packet
esp = ipv6.payload # ESP-protected BU follows IPv6 layer
ipv6.payload = None # Remove IPv6 payload from packet
del(lower.plen) # Delete length to have it recomputed
# Build HAO in DestOpt with NH set to 50 (ESP)
hao = HAO(hoa=ipv6.src)
destopt = IPv6ExtHdrDestOpt(options=[hao], nh=50)
ipv6.src = attacker_addr # used to send packet
# Set IPv6 NH value to DestOpt
ipv6.nh = 60
# Result is made of mangled IPv6 pkt, followed by Destination
# Option header carrying the HAO, followed by the (unchanged)
# ESP-protected BU
p = ipv6 / destopt / esp
...
For clarity, the ESP-protected BU received by the attacker from the
MN after having sent the RA and announced itself as the MN's HA has
the following layout:
###[ IPv6 ]###
version= 6L
tc= 0L
fl= 0L
plen= 84
nh= ESP Header
hlim= 64
src= 2001:db8::2:20d:93ff:fe55:8f79
dst= 2001:db8::2:21e:bff:fe4e:3b2
###[ ESP Extension Header ]###
spi = 0x0990cbed
seq = 3
load= "\x97\xd2w\xadx9\x88\xa2\xba\x90\xcd\xd9\xa..."
The address of the MN is 2001:db8::2:20d:93ff:fe55:8f79. The address
of the HA is 2001:db8::2:21e:bff:fe4e:3b2.
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The packet sent to the HA at the end of the mangling process
associated with previous code has the following layout:
###[ IPv6 ]###
version= 6L
tc= 0L
fl= 0L
plen= 108
nh= Destination Option Header
hlim= 64
src= 2001:db8::4:207:40ff:fe53:e1e4
dst= 2001:db8::2:21e:bff:fe4e:3b2
###[ IPv6 Extension Header - Destination Options Header ]###
nh= ESP Header
len= 2
autopad= On
\options\
|###[ PadN ]###
| otype= PadN [00: skip, 0: Don't change en-route]
| optlen= 2
| optdata= '\x00\x00'
|###[ Home Address Option ]###
| otype= Home Address Option [11: discard+ICMP not mcast,
| 0: Don't change en-route]
| optlen= 16
| hoa= 2001:db8::2:20d:93ff:fe55:8f79
###[ ESP Extension Header ]###
spi = 0x0990cbed
seq = 3
load= "\x97\xd2w\xadx9\x88\xa2\xba\x90\xcd\xd9\xa..."
Its source address is now the address of the attacker (2001:db8::4:
207:40ff:fe53:e1e4) which provides it connectivity to the internet in
order to reach the HA (the unmodified destination address found in
the IPv6 header of the packet, i.e. 2001:db8::2:21e:bff:fe4e:3b2).
The address of the MN (2001:db8::2:20d:93ff:fe55:8f79) is now found
in the inserted Home Address Option. The ESP Extension Header has
not been modified in the process. It should be noted that the
payload length field of the IPv6 header has been recomputed by Scapy:
its value differs from the one in the initial packet due to the
addition of the Destination Option Header.
Having implemented the mangling of the BU, the attacker expects the
HA to reply (if the BU is accepted) with a BA. This BA, sent to the
address of the attacker, will include a Type 2 Routing Header (RH2).
Unlike previous mangling which required the insertion of an extension
header in the packet (the Destination Option Header), the attacker
now needs to remove the RH2 from the BA and set the MN's HoA as
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destination address in the IPv6 header before sending it to the peer.
Improving the PoC to do that can be done in the following way:
...
ipv6 = pkt[IPv6] # access IPv6 layer from received packet
rh2 = pkt.payload # RH2 follows IPv6
esp = rh2.payload # ESP follows RH2
ipv6.payload = None # Remove what follows IPv6 header
del(lower.plen) # Delete length to have it recomputed
ipv6.dst=rh2.addresses[0] # Set HoA from RH2 as IPv6 dst address
ipv6.nh = 50 # Update IPv6 next header field value
p = ipv6 / esp
...
For clarity, the ESP-protected BA received by the attacker as a
response from the HA has the following layout:
###[ IPv6 ]###
version= 6L
tc= 0L
fl= 0L
plen= 92
nh= Routing Header
hlim= 64
src= 2001:db8::2:21e:bff:fe4e:3b2
dst= 2001:db8::4:207:40ff:fe53:e1e4
###[ IPv6 Option Header Routing ]###
nh= ESP Header
len= 2
type= 2
segleft= 1
reserved= 0L
addresses= [ 2001:db8::2:20d:93ff:fe55:8f79 ]
###[ ESP Extension Header ]###
spi = 0x0cdede2b
seq = 3
load= '\xbd\x8aq\xb4\xfa\xccR\xfa\xa3Q\tf\x89...'
The packet obtained at the end of the mangling process associated
with previous code has the following layout:
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###[ IPv6 ]###
version= 6L
tc= 0L
fl= 0L
plen= 68
nh= ESP Header
hlim= 64
src= 2001:db8::2:21e:bff:fe4e:3b2
dst= 2001:db8::2:20d:93ff:fe55:8f79
###[ ESP Extension Header ]###
spi = 0x0cdede2b
seq = 3
load= '\xbd\x8aq\xb4\xfa\xccR\xfa\xa3Q\tf\x89...'
As for previous mangling operation, the value of the payload length
field in the packet has been automatically recomputed by Scapy to
reflect the removal of the RH2.
5.4. Conclusion
5.4.1. Results
Implementing a PoC to test the effects of all theoretical attacks
against UMIP was easily done by developing a small Automaton under
Scapy (few lines of Python code).
With such a tool, an attacker simply advertising the Home Subnet
prefix of a MN is able to make it believe it is at home. Depending
on the configuration of the MN, this may allow the attacker to
directly target the MN:
o If OptimisticHandoff configuration option is disabled (the
default) this result in a simple DoS, the MN waiting for a BA
before it is able to communicate.
o If OptimisticHandoff configuration option is enabled, the MN can
then be joined on its HoA but cannot sent traffic from that
address (i.e. reply for instance) until the reception of the BA.
When the attacker also activates the relaying of BU from the MN to
the HA and the relaying of the associated BA from the HA to the MN,
the attack gets effective: the MN is fully deregistered and does no
more use IPsec protection for data traffic, believing it is on its
home network.
The attack works against UMIP implementation because the values found
in the source address of the IPv6 packet, the Home Address Option and
the AltCoA are not invalid from a specification standpoint, for a de-
registration BU.
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Another reason is that the addition (respectively removal) of the
Destination Option Header (respectively RH2) in the the BU
(respectively BA) does not interfere with the protection provided by
ESP on the signaling traffic.
5.4.2. UMIP improvements
In this subsection, we discuss the additional checks that UMIP should
implement in order to prevent previous attacks. Note that those
checks should only be seen as workarounds/improvements of current
situation, but not as a complete solution to the Home Link Detection
mechanism.
UMIP should not enforce an optimistic behavior when coming back home,
i.e. it should not drop its IPsec tunnel protection before the BA is
received from the HA. This does not make much sense from a
performance point of view and has security impacts, leading to the
ability for an attacker to have the MN handle incoming traffic (even
though the MN is unable to reply until it receives the protected BA
from the HA).
UMIP should be modified in order for the HA to perform stricter
checks on incoming BU and only allow the following layouts for de-
registration BU:
o Case 1 (Home De-registration): Lifetime is set to 0, the packet
does not contain an AltCoA option, does not contain a Destination
Option Header carrying a HAO and has HoA as IPv6 source address.
o Case 2 (Remote De-registration): Lifetime is set to 0, the packet
IPv6 source address is current registered CoA, the packet contains
a Destination Option Header carrying a HAO (which contains the
HoA), the packet contains an AltCoA option carrying current
registered CoA (i.e. matching IPv6 source address of the packet).
Not that those proposed checks are stricter than the one expected
from a RFC3775-compliant implementation which may result in
interoperability issues. Ironically enough, if such strict layouts
had been initially specified in the reference documents, this would
have helped, both from interoperability and security standpoints.
As detailed in the appendix, the rules for MN and HA for the creation
and processing of BU are more than fuzzy in reference documents.
Those are spread over at least 4 sections of [RFC3775]: 6.1.7, 9.5.1,
10.3.2, 11.7.1. Rules for the sender (MN) and the receiver (HA) do
not match on some aspects, for no specific reasons.
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6. Workarounds and solutions
In this subsection, we discuss some possible leads for solving the
issue presented in the document.
6.1. Improve reference documents consistency
Without considering here the security impacts of current Home Link
Detection mechanism (discussed in following subsections), current
MIPv6 specification (and also [draft-ietf-mext-rfc3775bis]) would
need some work in order to define BU/BA processing/handling in a more
precise and consistent way.
For instance, the allowed format of de-registration BU (AltCoA
option, HAO in Destination Option Header, IPv6 source address, ...)
should be precisely described for both cases (home and remote de-
registration) instead of relying on information from different
sections. This would both help in the development and security
review.
6.2. Use of SEND in Home Link Detection mechanism
The first idea that comes to mind is to try and work on the root of
the issues, the Home Link Detection mechanism. By removing an
attacker the ability to spoof RA on a foreign network with crafted
ones including PIO with Home Subnet Prefix, the issue could possibly
be prevented.
For that purpose, from a theoretical standpoint, SEND could directly
be used, simply by creating a Secure Home Link Detection mechanism in
which it would be required that RA advertising the Home Subnet Prefix
be signed. That way, an attacker on a foreign link would not be able
to trigger a deregistration and this would prevent the IPsec tunnel
protection to be dropped.
It should be noted that this possible solution comes with the
following drawbacks:
o It requires SEND to be implement on the Home Network.
o It requires SEND to be supported by the MIPv6 module.
o It does not protect the MNs on a foreign link against an attacker
that has simultaneous access to both the MN's Home Subnet and the
MN's foreign subnet. Even if this is a strong hypothesis.
6.3. Never drop IPsec tunnel protection
MIPv6 specification does not mandate the removal of the tunneling
between the MN and the HA. [RFC3776] and [RFC4877], even if they
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expect the IPsec tunnel to be torn down when back home, do not
mandate it either.
It is possible to solve the issue by having MN warning their HA that
they are not willing to drop their IPsec tunnel when back home. This
simple solution (indicating that willingness to keep IPsec tunnel
protection up and running on the home subnet is just a matter of a
single flag in a BU) would provide an efficient workaround to the
issue.
It would also be possible not to advertise anything in the BU (not
consume a flag) and let that as a local configuration issue between
the MN and the HA (requiring configuration to be in sync on both
sides).
One would argue that this solution (maintaining IPsec tunneling on
the Home Network) could have negative drawbacks on performance.
6.4. No home network
The last obvious and most simple solution to the issue is basically
another a variant of previous proposal (``Never drop IPsec tunnel
protection''), but this time by removing the ability for the MN to
come back home (i.e. remove the concept of Home Network for a MN) and
consider the home network is virtual.
7. IANA Considerations
This section is purposely kept empty.
8. Security Considerations
The whole document discusses security considerations on the Home Link
Detection mechanisms defined in [RFC3775]. It covers the implication
of its use when IPsec is used to protect data traffic (as allowed/
expected by reference documents).
Expected format and handling of BU/BA by HA/MN are discussed from a
security perspective.
9. References
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9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3756] Nikander, P., Kempf, J., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Neighbor
Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats", RFC 3756,
May 2004.
[RFC3775] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.
[RFC3776] Arkko, J., Devarapalli, V., and F. Dupont, "Using IPsec to
Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling Between Mobile Nodes and
Home Agents", RFC 3776, June 2004.
[RFC4877] Devarapalli, V. and F. Dupont, "Mobile IPv6 Operation with
IKEv2 and the Revised IPsec Architecture", RFC 4877,
April 2007.
[RFC5026] Giaretta, G., Kempf, J., and V. Devarapalli, "Mobile IPv6
Bootstrapping in Split Scenario", RFC 5026, October 2007.
9.2. Informative References
[draft-haddad-mext-mip6-residual-threats]
Haddad, W., Tsirtsis, G., Lim, B., Krishnan, S., and F.
Dupont, "Mobile IPv6 Residual Threats",
draft-haddad-mext-mip6-residual-threats-02 (work in
progress), July 2008.
[draft-ietf-mext-rfc3775bis]
Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
in IPv6", draft-ietf-mext-rfc3775bis-03 (work in
progress), March 2009.
[draft-krishnan-mext-hld]
Krishnan, S. and G. Tsirtsis, "MIPv6 Home Link Detection",
draft-krishnan-mext-hld-01 (work in progress), March 2008.
Appendix A. MIPv6 Home Return
To keep the core of the document readable but still have the details
available, this appendix provides a comprehensive analysis of MIPv6
main reference documents for what is related to Home Link detection
and the ``Returning Home'' events.
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A.1. Mobile IPv6 Home Link detection mechanism
The Mobile IPv6 Home Link detection mechanism is quite simple. In
fact, it is specified in [RFC3775] by a simple sentence, in section
11.5.4 (``Returning Home''):
A mobile node detects that it has returned to its home link through
the movement detection algorithm in use (Section 11.5.1), when the
mobile node detects that its home subnet prefix is again
on-link.
At the time of writing, MIPv6 specification is being revised and that
part of the document has been enhanced, to support interactions with
IKEv2 for Home Prefix Assignment [RFC5026]. Current version (02) of
the draft [draft-ietf-mext-rfc3775bis] now includes a new specific
subsection providing a simple detection algorithm (based on
[draft-krishnan-mext-hld]) . The relevant part of the algorithm is
provided below:
...
o Given the availability of the home prefix, the MN checks whether
or not the home prefix matches one of the prefixes received in the
RA. If it does, the MN concludes that it has returned home.
...
It basically goes in the same direction as [RFC3775]: Mobile Node
considers itself on its home link if it detects a match between an
advertised prefix and its home subnet prefix.
In the end, the expected Home Link detection mechanism has not been
modified compared to the one specified in the original MIPv6
specification: simply put, if the MN finds itself on a link where its
Home Subnet Prefix is advertised, it considers itself at home.
A.2. Emission of deregistration BU by the MN
This excerpt from section 11.5.4 (``Returning Home'') of [RFC3776]
(In current revision 02 of the document [draft-ietf-mext-rfc3775bis],
the section has not been modified, but now has number 11.5.5)
describes the emission of the deregistration BU to the HA, just after
it has detected it is at home (using previous mechanism):
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...
The mobile node SHOULD then send a Binding Update to its
home agent, to instruct its home agent to no longer intercept or
tunnel packets for it. In this home registration, the mobile node
MUST set the Acknowledge (A) and Home Registration (H) bits, set
the Lifetime field to zero, and set the care-of address for the
binding to the mobile node's own home address. The mobile node
MUST use its home address as the source address in the Binding
Update.
...
As for all Binding Update messages sent to the Home Agent as part of
Home Registration, IPsec protection is expected. Usually, in order
for the CoA information to be IPsec protected (ESP does not provide
protection for packet source address), the Alternate CoA Option must
be present in the BU. This is explicitly stated in Section 11.7.1
(``Sending Binding Updates to the Home Agent'') of [RFC3776]:
...
o The care-of address for the binding MUST be used as the Source
Address in the packet's IPv6 header, unless an Alternate Care-of
Address mobility option is included in the Binding Update. This
option MUST be included in all home registrations, as the ESP
protocol will not be able to protect care-of addresses in the IPv6
header. (Mobile IPv6 implementations that know they are using
IPsec AH to protect a particular message might avoid this option.
For brevity the usage of AH is not discussed in this document.)
...
Nonetheless, this expected behavior is somewhat different when the
Mobile Node is at home and needs to send its Binding Update. This is
described at the end of the following excerpt from Section 4.3
(``IPsec Protocol Processing'') of [RFC3776]:
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o When ESP is used to protect Binding Updates, there is no
protection for the care-of address which appears in the IPv6
header outside the area protected by ESP. It is important for the
home agent to verify that the care-of address has not been
tampered with. As a result, the attacker would have redirected
the mobile node's traffic to another address. In order to prevent
this, Mobile IPv6 implementations MUST use the Alternate Care-of
Address mobility option in Binding Updates sent by mobile nodes
while away from home. The exception to this is when the mobile
node returns home and sends a Binding Update to the home agent in
order to de-register. In this case no Alternate Care-of Address
option is needed, as described in Section 3.1.
More specifically, as described in section 11.5.4 of [RFC3775], the
HoA must be set as source address of the Binding Update message:
...
In this home registration, the mobile node MUST set [...] the
care-of address for the binding to the mobile node's own home
address. The mobile node MUST use its home address as the source
address in the Binding Update.
...
Still in [RFC3776] (Section 3.1,``Binding Updates and
Acknowledgements''), specific examples of expected packet layouts are
given for registration when the node comes back home:
When the mobile node is at home, the above rules are different as
the mobile node can use its home address as a source address. This
typically happens for the de-registration Binding Update when the
mobile is returning home. In this situation, the Binding Updates
MUST support at least the following headers in the following order:
IPv6 header (source = home address,
destination = home agent)
ESP header in transport mode
Mobility header
Binding Update
This layout is associated with ``MUST support'' statements and is
expected to be used. Note that [RFC4877], the revised version of
[RFC3776], provides the same description and expects the same
behavior.
It is interesting to note that MIPv6 specification splits the
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emission and validation steps: previous discussion were associated
with the emission of the deregistration BU by the MN. Processing
rules for validation and parsing of BU by the HA when receiving it
are covered in different sections of the document and discussed later
in next subsection.
A.3. Receipt and validation of deregistration BU by the HA
The reference documents require that Home Agent supports previous
Layout for deregistration Binding Update. Even if this is probably
the expected layout, this is not the only possible solution.
Additional information are given in Section 9.5.1 of [RFC3775], for
validating Binding Update messages in general.
Section 10.3.2 of [RFC3775] covers in details ``Primary Care-of
Address De-Registration''. Here, the validation of deregistration BU
format by the HA leaves room for different layouts:
A binding may need to be de-registered when the mobile node returns
home or when the mobile node knows that it will not have any
care-of addresses in the visited network.
A Binding Update is validated and authorized in the manner described
in the previous section; note that when the mobile node de-registers
when it is at home, it may not include the Home Address destination
option, in which case the mobile node's home address is the source IP
address of the de-registration Binding Update. This section
describes the processing of a valid Binding Update that requests the
receiving node to no longer serve as its home agent, de-registering
its primary care-of address.
The non-normative ``may not include the Home Address destination
option'' is ambiguous and error-prone: section 11.5.4 has a ``MUST
use its home address as the source address in the Binding Update''.
If the Home Agent allows deregistration BUs with Home Address
destination option, this leaves room for those to be sent from a
foreign network, probably to support the case where ``the mobile node
knows that it will not have any care-of addresses in the visited
network''.
Because of the rules for determining care-of address and home
address, provided in section 9.5.1
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The specified care-of address MUST be determined as follows:
o If the Alternate Care-of Address option is present, the care-of
address is the address in that option.
o Otherwise, the care-of address is the Source Address field in the
packet's IPv6 header.
The home address for the binding MUST be determined as follows:
o If the Home Address destination option is present, the home
address is the address in that option.
o Otherwise, the home address is the Source Address field in the
packet's IPv6 header.
The following various deregistration BU sent by a Mobile Node should
probably be considered valid (even if the specific layout may not be
supported on a specific implementation):
IPv6 header (source = some address (possibly the HoA),
destination = home agent)
ESP header in transport mode
Mobility header
Binding Update
Alternate Care-of Address option (Home Address)
IPv6 header (source = Home Address,
destination = home agent)
Destination Options header
Home Address option (home address)
ESP header in transport mode
Mobility header
Binding Update
IPv6 header (source = some address (possibly the HoA),
destination = home agent)
Destination Options header
Home Address option (home address)
ESP header in transport mode
Mobility header
Binding Update
Alternate Care-of Address option (Home Address)
The last example is the common layout expected by the HA when the MN
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is on a foreign network.
The point here is that the expected layout for deregistration BU sent
by the MN should be strictly checked by the HA when receiving the BU.
It seems that the receiving rules for the HA are not that strict,
possibly to support the case where ``mobile node knows that it will
not have any care-of addresses in the visited network''.
A.4. Local impacts of BU processing on the HA and emission of BA
In this subsection, we just make the hypothesis that the HA has
received a deregistration BU which it has considered valid and that
it has determined the care-of address and the home-address as
described in section 9.5.1 of [RFC3775], quoted in previous
subsection.
The expected behavior by the HA is to remove the binding (local
modification of MIPv6 related structures). It is also expected (even
if not mandatory) that the tunnel with the Mobile Node be removed,
now that it is back home. This is described at the end of section
11.5.4 of [RFC3775]:
Note that the tunnel via the home agent typically stops operating at
the same time that the home registration is deleted.
When IPsec is used for protecting tunneled traffic, the same behavior
is expected. Section 4.2 of [RFC4877] specifies that:
o When the mobile node returns home and de-registers with the Home
Agent, the tunnel between the home agent and the mobile node's
care-of address is torn down. The security policy entries, which
were used for protecting tunneled traffic between the mobile node
and the home agent, SHOULD be made inactive (for instance, by
removing them and installing them back later through an API). The
corresponding security associations could be kept as they are or
deleted depending on how they were created. If the security
associations were created dynamically using IKE, they are
automatically deleted when they expire. If the security
associations were created through manual configuration, they MUST
be retained and used later when the mobile node moves away from
home again. The security associations protecting Binding Updates,
Binding Acknowledgements and Mobile Prefix Discovery messages
SHOULD NOT be deleted as they do not depend on care-of addresses
and can be used again.
This SHOULD in [RFC4877] was a MUST in [RFC3776]. The protection of
BU/BA traffic using ESP in transport mode is unmodified by the
deregistration.
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After those changes, the HA sends back a BA to the MN. This is
required because the A bit is set in the BU sent by the MN for de-
registration, a BA is always sent by the HA, as described in section
9.5.4 of [draft-ietf-mext-rfc3775bis]:
o If the Binding Update was discarded as described in Section 9.2
or Section 9.5.1, a Binding Acknowledgement MUST NOT be sent.
Otherwise the treatment depends on the following rules.
o If the Acknowledge (A) bit set is set in the Binding Update, a
Binding Acknowledgement MUST be sent. Otherwise, the treatment
depends on the below rule.
o If the node rejects the Binding Update due to an expired nonce
index, sequence number being out of window (Section 9.5.1), or
insufficiency of resources (Section 9.5.2), a Binding
Acknowledgement MUST be sent. If the node accepts the Binding
Update, the Binding Acknowledgement SHOULD NOT be sent.
This means that following the emission of a deregistration BU, a MN
should expect to receive a BA.
With regard to the address the BA is sent, section 9.5.4 of [RFC3775]
contains the following:
If the Source Address field of the IPv6 header that carried the
Binding Update does not contain a unicast address, the Binding
Acknowledgement MUST NOT be sent and the Binding Update packet MUST
be silently discarded. Otherwise, the acknowledgement MUST be sent
to the Source Address. Unlike the treatment of regular packets, this
addressing procedure does not use information from the Binding Cache.
However, a routing header is needed in some cases. If the Source
Address is the home address of the mobile node, i.e., the Binding
Update did not contain a Home Address destination option, then the
Binding Acknowledgement MUST be sent to that address and the routing
header MUST NOT be used. Otherwise, the Binding Acknowledgement MUST
be sent using a type 2 routing header which contains the mobile
node's home address.
This basically implies that a deregistration BU with a HAO will
possibly trigger a BA with a RH2 sent to whatever address was in the
IPv6 header source address field in the BU. Simply put, the BA is
expect to be sent to the real address from which the BU was sent.
In section 3.1 of [RFC3776], the common cases for the deregistration
BA sent from the home network is covered:
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The Binding Acknowledgement messages sent to the home address MUST
support at least the following headers in the following order:
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = home address)
ESP header in transport mode
Mobility header
Binding Acknowledgement
A.5. Local impact associated with BU emission and BA processing on the
MN
Once it has sent the deregistration BU, the MN is expected to perform
some modification of its ND behavior, as discussed in section 11.5.5
(``Returning home'') of [draft-ietf-mext-rfc3775bis]. Some final
changes are performed after receiving the BA from the HA:
After the Mobile Node sends the Binding Update, it MUST be prepared
to reply to Neighbor Solicitations for its home address. Such
replies MUST be sent using a unicast Neighbor Advertisement to the
sender's link-layer address. It is necessary to reply, since sending
the Binding Acknowledgement from the home agent may require
performing Neighbor Discovery, and the mobile node may not be able to
distinguish Neighbor Solicitations coming from the home agent from
other Neighbor Solicitations. Note that a race condition exists
where both the mobile node and the home agent respond to the same
solicitations sent by other nodes; this will be only temporary,
however, until the Binding Update is accepted.
After receiving the Binding Acknowledgement for its Binding Update to
its home agent, the mobile node MUST multicast onto the home link (to
the all-nodes multicast address) a Neighbor Advertisement [20], to
advertise the mobile node's own link-layer address for its own home
address.
The specification focuses on link layer interactions but does not
provide information on the timing associated with the removal of the
tunnel and/or IPsec Security Policies for tunnel traffic. For
performance reasons it usually happens when the BU is sent (UMIP, the
linux implementation, does just that) to avoid sending packets with a
possibly invalid source address (the old CoA) while waiting for the
BA to come back.
If the same timing is kept when returning home, the MN will drop its
IPsec protection as soon as it has sent the deregistration Binding
Update.
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Appendix B. Acknowledgements
The author acknowledges the comments and corrections provided by
Jean-Michel Combes, Tony Cheneau, Nicolas Bareil and Romain Kuntz on
an initial version of the document.
The work on this document was done in the context of MobiSEND
project, partially funded by the french "National Research Agency
(ANR)".
This document was generated by xml2rfc.
Author's Address
Arnaud Ebalard
EADS Innovation Works
12, rue Pasteur - BP76
Suresnes 92152
France
Phone: +33 1 46 97 30 28
Email: arnaud.ebalard@eads.net
Ebalard Expires November 1, 2009 [Page 32]
