Internet DRAFT - draft-erblich-ospf-nbr-rexmit-robust-enhance
draft-erblich-ospf-nbr-rexmit-robust-enhance
Network Working Group
Internet draft Mitchell Erblich
November 2004
Category: Informational
Document: <draft-erblich-ospf-nbr-rexmit-robust-enhance-00.txt>
Robust Enhancement to the Neighbor's Retransmission
List when one or more LSA Checksum and length are in
Error
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
of section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each
author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of
which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of
which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
RFC 3668.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as
Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 30, 2005.
Abstract
The ability to process LSAs within a Update packet
requires that the length field be correct to generate
the next offset within the packet. During the rare
times that a checksum error and length LSA fields are
incorrect, the beginning of later LSAs header's can't
be determined. This draft specifies a transparent
method to allow all valid LSAs to be processed even
when these corrupted LSAs exist on the neighbor's
retransmission list.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ............... 2
2. Neighbor retransmission list robust enhancement 2
3. Alternative neighbor retransmission robust enhancement 2
4. References ................. 3
5. Security Considerations .... 3
6. Author's Address ........... 3
1. Introduction
RFC [2328] for OSPFv2 specifies that on page 142
all the LSAs that exist within the Update packet be
processed. In the event that LSAs within this packet
are not acknowledged, the non acknowledged LSAs will
be retransmitted. These non acknowledged LSAs are
repeatedly retrieved for retransmission from the neighbor's
retransmission list.
In the past, networks have been moderated by router's
bandwidth, memory, and other limitations and have
summarized their links. This has kept link-state databases
from expanding to excessive levels. However, this has
come with a resultant loss of metric information. With
current and near future technology, LSDBs can expand
to current levels.
What was once rare checksum and length errors within
moderately sized LSDBs can become common place when
a router is dealing with millions of LSAs.
To allow the OSPF specifications to scale when dealing
with the once rare event of a checksum and length LSA
error existing on the neighbor retransmission list,
rare error events need to be handled.
2. Neighbor retransmission list robust enhancement
With the assumption that a a corrupted LSA with a bad
checksum and length is on the neighbor retransmission
list. If later non corrupted LSAs are ordered after
this corrupted LSA, they can never be processed.
A transparent change to the receiver requires that the
LSA transmitter alter the order of LSAs that are appearing
on the Update packet.
The method chosen was to rotate the order by one position
on each neighbor retransmission as if the LSAs were in a
circular buffer. This allows all the non corrupted LSAs to
be processed by the receiver over time.
3. Alternative neighbor retransmission robust enhancement
With the assumption that retransmission of LSAs may
infrequently occur due to checksum / length failures
and that the problem occurred before the LSAs was
copied to the neighbor retransmission LSA list.
An alternative method is for the sender to periodically
run a checksum scan on the retransmission LSA list
and remove corrupted LSAs from the retransmission list.
The suggested period is 30 seconds to prevent normal
retransmissions from having additional checksum overhead.
4. References
[2328] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", RFC 2328, April 1998.
5. Security Considerations
This memo does not create any new security issues for
the OSPF protocol.
6. Authors Address
Mitchell Erblich
erblichs@earthlink.net
"Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights."
"This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE."