Internet DRAFT - draft-floroiu-u2u-ake
draft-floroiu-u2u-ake
J. Floroiu
Internet-Draft Fokus Fraunhofer
Expires: April 14, 2005 October 15, 2004
An User-to-User Authenticated Key Exchange Mechanism
Based on the UMTS Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)
draft-floroiu-u2u-ake-00.txt
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Abstract
The present draft describes an user-to-user (u2u) authenticated key
exchange mechanism based on the UMTS AKA mechanism [1]. The proposed
scheme is based on the generation of security tokens (in fact
encrypted public Diffie-Hellman keys) by the peer's operator. Such a
security token along with credential information contained within the
peer's AKA Authentication Vector (AV) enables two communicating peers
to securely derive a shared key.
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Introduction
Many protocols define security extensions aimed at protecting the
data traffic or signalling between two communicating peers. Most of
the security extensions are based on symmetric cryptography due to the
relative computational efficiency of the symmetric cryptographic
algorithms as compared to the asymmetric ones.
The establishment of a shared key between two communicating parties
however requires a key establishment protocol and the presence of an
infrastructure able to provide the credentials necessary to achieve
the mutual authentication of the parties.
The present draft describes a mechanism based on "security tokens"
issued by the peer's Home Subscriber Server (HSS) that enables two
peers to securely derive a shared key using relatively unexpensive
cryptographic operations. The exchange requires three trips and may
be easily piggybacked into other signalling protocols (for example
SIP).
Notations
| concatenation
E(K,P) encryption of payload "P" using the key "K"
A, B A's respectively B's identity
AUTN AKA Authentication Token
RAND AKA Random Challange
XRES Expected Response
IK AKA Integrity Key
CK AKA Cipher Key
..._X a certain piece of information pertaining to entity "X"
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1. Security Token Acquisition
Figure 1 illustrates the message exchange that enables a user to
acquire a security token from the peer's HSS entity. This phase must
precede the actual establishment of a secure connection between the
two parties.
In the example, user A gets a public Diffie-Hellman key encrypted by
B's HSS, along with B's credentials that later on will help B derive
the encryption key. The exchange is assumed to take place over
authenticated channels.
In the first message A provides the peer's identity and its public
Diffie-Hellman key and gets it back encrypted with one of the B's
private key along with the B's credentials that correspond to that
key. HSS_A is assumed to be able to route the message based on B's
identity to the appropriate HSS, with whom it must necessary share a
trust relationship.
A HSS_A HSS_B
| 1: B, g^a | |
| -------------------------> | 2: B, g^a |
| | -----------------------> |
| | |
| | 3: AUTN_B, RAND_B, |
| 4: AUTN_B, RAND_B, | XRES_B, E{CK_B, g^a} |
| XRES_B, E{CK_B, g^a} | <----------------------- |
| <------------------------- | |
| | |
Figure 1
2. The Key Exchange
It is assumed that A and B have acquired such tokens prior to initiating an
authenticated key exchange (Figure 2).
A initiates the key exchange by sending the security token along with
a challange to B. B checks the authenticity of AUTN_B, derives CK_B
and retrieves g^a. It then picks up a security token <AUTN_A, RAND_A,
XRES_A, b, E{CK_A, g^b}> it has acquired from A's operator and
computes the shared key K = g^(ab). Finally it replies in message 6
with the public part of the security token and the response encrypted
with the shared key K.
Upon receiving message 6, A follows similar steps to authenticate the
token and retrieve the shared key K. The exchange concludes with
message 7, which contains A's response, based on which B can decide
whether the party is indeed genuine and the exchange was sucessful.
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A B
| |
| 5: AUTN_B, RAND_B, E{CK_B, g^a} |
| ------------------------------------------------------------> |
| 6: AUTN_A, RAND_A, E{CK_A, g^b}, E{K, CK_B, RES_B} |
| <------------------------------------------------------------ |
| 7: E{K, CK_A, RES_A} |
| ------------------------------------------------------------> |
Figure 2
In order to enable the peers to verify that the original public
Diffie-Hellman keys have not been modified on the fly (for instance
by the HSS entities themselves), the shared keys used in the first
phase to compute the security tokens are included in the messages 6
and 7. Both parties will therefore be able to check the integrity of
the security tokens, which up to this stage have been opaque data.
Later versions of the draft will document the error sequences,
currently missing.
3. Security Considerations
The main goal of the proposed protocol is to avoid the HSS entities
to act as man-in-the-middle during the authenticated key exchange
between two parties. As determined so far this purpose seems to be
achieved, further analysis is however necessary.
4. IANA COnsiderations
None.
References
[1] 3GPP TS 33.102 v6.0.0 Security architecture, September 2003;
Author's Address
John W. Floroiu
Fokus Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems
Kaiserin Augusta Allee 31
10589 Berlin, Germany
Email: floroiu@fokus.fraunhofer.de
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